

Message Text

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FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE

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TAGS: PFOR, PDIP, XA, UR, CU

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF DRAFT RESPONSES TO PRM-36

FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF FIRST DRAFT OF REPLY TO PRM-36 WAS
PREPARED BY AF AND S/P FOR YOUR INFORMATION. DAS WALKER
SHOULD HAVE COPY OF DRAFT SECTION THREE OF RESPONSE,
WHICH COVERS SUGGESTED OPTIONS.

1. PRM 36: SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT, PRESENT AND
POTENTIAL:

THE SOVIETS AND THE CUBANS HAVE NEARLY 60,000 CIVILIAN
AND MILITARY PERSONNEL SCATTERED ACROSS AFRICA. ALTHOUGH
THERE ARE SOVIETS IN SOME 35 COUNTRIES AND CUBANS IN 13,
SOVIET/CUBAN ACTIVITY IS FOCUSED IN ANGOLA, ETHIOPIA, AND
THE NATIONS NEIGHBORING RHODESIA. THE USSR HAS SUPPLIED
MASSIVE QUANTITIES OF MILITARY AID; CUBA HAS SUPPLIED THE
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MANPOWER (CURRENTLY SOME 42-27,000). SOVIET AND CUBAN
OBJECTIVES IN AFRICA ARE HARMONIOUS BUT NOT SYNONYMOUS.
CUBA'S AFRICA POLICY HAS GROWN OUT OF ITS ACTIVIST, REVOLU-
TIONARY DOCTRINE AND CASTRO'S ALMOST MESSIANIC ZEAL TO
DEMINISH US AND OTHER WESTERN INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD.
CASTRO'S AFRICAN POLICY HAS ENABLED HIM TO PLAY A MAJOR
INTERNATIONAL ROLE AS A SUPPORTER OF REVOLUTIONARY MOVE-
MENTS AND "PROGRESSIVE" REGIMES. CUBA'S NON-ALIGNED AND
REVOLUTIONARY" MODERATES GIVE THE CUBANS ACCEPTABILITY
AND CREDIBILITY IN AFRICA WHICH THE SOVIETS LACK.

CUBA IS NOT LIKELY TO ABANDON ITS OBJECTIVES IN AFRICA EASILY OR SOON. THERE ARE IN FACT PROBABLY ONLY THREE SETS OF CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD CAUSE THE CUBANS TO CONSIDER WITHDRAWAL: (1) A CLEAR DEMAND ON THE PART OF THE AFRICAN "CONSTITUENCY" WHICH THUS FAR HAS FOUND THE CUBAN PRESENCE ACCEPTABLE, (2) A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL OR DRASTIC REDUCTION OF THEIR 2 BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR SUBSIDY, AND (3) DIRECT US MILITARY MEASURES OR THEIR THREAT.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES APPEAR TO BE A MIX OF GEOPOLITICAL GRAND STRATEGY AND OPPORTUNISTIC EXPLOITATION OF INSTABILITY AND CONFLICT. JUDGING FROM SOVIET ACTIONS, THEIR MOTIVATIONS SEEM TO BE GEOGRAPHICALLY DIFFERENTIATED. SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE NORTHERN PART OF AFRICA APPEARS TO BE RELATED TO A BROAD GEOPOLITICAL STRATEGY INVOLVING SOVIET INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN WESTERN EUROPE, THE MEDITERRANEAN, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE INDIAN OCEAN. BY ESTABLISHING A STRONG, PERMANENT PRESENCE IN THE HORN, THE SOVIETS MAY HOPE TO INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING ON THE MAJOR PERSIAN GULF AND SAUDI OIL PRODUCERS, WHILE RADIATING SOVIET INFLUENCE INTO THE INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTHWARD INTO AFRICA. IN MOST OF SUB-SECRET

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SAHARAN AFRICA, SOVIET POLICY, IN CONTRAST, HAS APPEARED PRIMARILY TO BE A CASE BY CASE EXPLOITATION OF TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY ARISING FROM THE COLLAPSE OF THE PORTUGUESE AFRICAN EMPIRE AND THE RACIAL AND COLONIAL TENSIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE SOVIETS HAVE OBTAINED SUBSTANTIAL DIVIDENDS IN POSITIONS AND INFLUENCE IN ANGOLA AND WITH ELEMENTS OF THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS IN RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA. THIS HAS NOT BEEN WITHOUT ITS COSTS IN TERMS OF LOCAL FACTIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIETS AND SOVIET INFLUENCE RARELY RUNS DEEP IN THE MINDS OF ITS "CLIENTS". THE SOVIETS ARE COMING TO BELIEVE THAT THEIR "GAINS" WILL BE AS EPHEMERAL AS THEY WERE IN AFRICA DURING THE 1960S UNLESS THEY ESTABLISH STRONG MARXIST-LENINIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE COUNTRIES WHERE THEIR INFLUENCE IS STRONGEST. EVEN THEN, THEIR ABILITY TO DOMINATE AND CONTROL SUCH PARTIES IS HIGHLY UNCERTAIN. WHILE CONTROL OF THE MINERAL RESOURCES AND STRATEGIC AREA OF SOUTH AFRICA, OVER THE LONG RUN, PROBABLY PLAYS SOME ROLE IN SOVIET GEOPOLITICAL THINKING, THIS IS A LESS IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE SHORT RUN THAN THE POLITICAL PROSPECT OF WEAKENING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WEST AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES AS A WHOLE IN THE FACE OF INCREASED RACIAL TENSION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

BECAUSE THE SOVIETS PLACE GREAT WEIGHT ON PRESERVING THEIR CREDIBILITY IN RESPONDING TO AFRICAN REQUESTS, THEY ARE SENSITIVE TO ACTIONS THAT LAY THEMSELVES OPEN TO CONDEMNATION.

TION FOR CROSSING FORBIDDEN AFRICAN LINES. THEY HAVE BEEN
AFFECTED BY RADICAL ARAB STATE PRESSURES NOT TO INTERVENE
IN ERITREA AND WERE QUICK TO DENY ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE
SHABA II ATTACK. SO LONG AS THE AFRICANS THEMSELVES
TOLERATE AND EVEN ENDORSE SOVIET AND CUBAN ASSISTANCE
TO ANGOLA, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, AND ETHIOPIA, HOWEVER,
WESTERN PRESSURES WILL HAVE LITTLE IMPACT IN INDUCING
THEIR WITHDRAWAL. SOVIET SHIP DRAWDOWNS OFF THE HORN WERE
PROBABLY THE RESULT OF DIMINISHED MILITARY NEEDS RATHER
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THAN ANY WESTERN PRESSURE.

OUR WARNINGS TO HAVANA THAT CONTINUED CUBAN MILITARY
ACTIVITY IN AFRICA WILL MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD NORMALIZATION
OF US-CUBAN RELATIONS IMPOSSIBLE HAVE HAD NO APPRECIABLE
EFFECT NOR HAS THE HALT OF DIVERT ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO
CUBA BY SEVERAL WESTERN GOVERNMENTS INFLUENCED CUBAN
POLICY; WHILE THE CUBANS ATTACH SOME VALUE TO IMPROVED
RELATIONS WITH US, THEY ATTACH EVEN MORE TO THEIR POLITI-
CAL GOALS IN AFRICA.

WITHIN THE NEXT 6 TO 12 MONTHS, THE CUBANS AND THE SOVIETS
WILL PROBABLY REMAIN OCCUPIED PRIMARILY WITH THEIR EXIS-
TING COMMITMENTS TO ANGOLA, ETHIOPIA, AND THE RHODESIAN
NATIONALISTS. THEY MAY INCREASE THE SCALE OF THESE
COMMITMENTS. THEY CAN ALSO BE EXPECTED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE
OF OPPORTUNITIES WHICH ARISE AS THE RESULT OF UNPREDIC-
TABLE EVENTS (E.G. THE DEATH OR OVERTHROW OF CURRENT
LEADERS). OVER THE LONG TERM, THEY PROBABLY CONSIDER
ZAIRE AND SOUTHERN AFRICA AS HAVING THE GREATEST POTENTIAL
FOR SUCCESSFUL SOVIET INTERVENTION.

2. PRM 36 RESPONSE: US AND OTHERS' INTERESTS AND OBJECT-
IVES IN LIMITING SOVIET/CUBAN INFLUENCE IN AFRICA

AFRICA HAS BECOME A LOCUS OF THE COMPETITION BETWEEN THE
US AND THE USSR. AFRICAN NATIONS, WHICH MUST OBTAIN NEED-
ED EXPERTISE AND AID FROM OUTSIDE, STRONGLY RESIST ANY
WESTERN EFFORT TO BRAND ALL SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT
IN AFRICA AS "UNACCEPTABLE." INDEED, SOVIET AND CUBAN
EFFORTS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ETC. ARE ENTIRELY
ACCEPTABLE TO US AS WELL AS TO THE AFRICANS.

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LIMITED ARMS TRANSFERS, TRAINING, AND MILITARY ADVISORS
REPRESENT A "GREY AREA", IN PART BECAUSE THEY OPEN THE
DOOR FOR LARGE-SCALE MILITARY EFFORTS WHICH, COUPLED WITH

SOVIET/CUBAN POLITICAL SPOILING TACTICS, ARE CLEARLY "UNACCEPTABLE" TO US. SUCH ACTIVITIES ENCOURAGE AFRICAN LEADERS TO SEEK MILITARY RATHER THAN NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS AND UNDERCUT THE POSITIONS OF MODERATE AFRICAN COUNSELS IN NEGOTIATIONS.

LARGE-SCALE SOVIET/CUBAN MILITARY INTERVENTION (A) SERIOUSLY ESCALATES THE LEVEL OF TENSION, GREATLY ENHANCES THE ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF THE ARMY IN THE NATION IN QUESTION, AND INCREASES THE PROSPECTS, FOR REGIONAL CONFLICT, AND (B) GIVES THE SOVIETS THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP LEVERAGE WITH THE RECIPIENT GOVERNMENTS ON A WIDE RANGE OF OTHER QUESTIONS, INCLUDING BASE FACILITIES AND OPERATING RIGHTS FOR SOVIET FORCES. FINALLY, SOVIET/CUBAN SUCCESS CAN INDUCE AN INCLINATION TOWARD POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION WITH THE SOVIETS ON THE PART OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND STIMULATES DEMANDS FOR WESTERN MILITARY AID IN STILL OTHERS.

THE EUROPEANS ARE AMBIVALENT ABOUT SOVIET/CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA; THEY REGARD SOVIET ACTIVITY AS A THREAT, BUT, EXPECT FOR FRANCE, HAVE NO PRESCRIPTIONS FOR COUNTERMEASURES BEYOND PRESSING FOR NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS IN NAMIBIA, RHODESIA, AND EVENTUALLY SOUTH AFRICA. DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS PREVENT COMMITMENT OF THEIR OWN FORCES. THEY ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER ECONOMIC OR MILITARY MATERIAL SUPPORT, BUT THERE ARE STRONG CONSTRAINTS AGAINST SUPPORT FOR REGIMES SEEN AS CORRUPT, UNSTABLE, OR WHICH TREAT THEIR OWN POPULATION HARSHLY.

THE EGYPTIANS AND THE SAUDIS ARE CONCERNED PRINCIPALLY ABOUT SOVIET/CUBAN ACTIVITY IN THE HORN, BUT HAVE ADDED ANGOLA, THE SUDAN, ZIMBABWE AND ZAIRE (FOLLOWING
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MOROCCO'S LEAD) TO THEIR WORRY LIST.

AFRICAN PRECEPTIONS OF SOVIET/CUBAN INVOLVEMENT VARY GREATLY. SOME SEE THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS AS POSITIVELY SUPPORTIVE OF AFRICAN INTERESTS; OTHERS SEE THE USSR AS SEEKING HEGEMONY OVER AFRICA; THOSE IN THE MIDDLE FIND SOVIET/CUBAN ACTIVITIES PERIPHERAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT NEEDS OF AFRICA BUT ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN PROBLEMS. OTHER THAN THE FRANCOPHONE "MODERATES", FEW AFRICAN STATES ARE PREPARED TO SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS.

3. PRM 36 RESPONSE: POLICY ACTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS IN DEALING WITH SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT.

THIS SECTION OF THE DRAFT RESPONSE TO PRM-36 REVIEWS THE VARIOUS DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL, MILITARY, INFORMATIONAL AND CLANDESTINE MEANS WE, OUR ALLIES, THE

AFRICANS AND OTHERS MIGHT BRING TO BEAR DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY TO MEET THE SOVIET-CUBAN CHALLENGE IN AFRICA. A REVIEW OF THESE INSTRUMENTS UNDERSCORES THE PAUCITY OF RESOURCES WE CAN BRING TO BEAR SHORT OF COVERT AND MILITARY ACTIONS DENIED TO US BY CURRENT LEGISLATION AND SENTIMENT ON THE HILL. THE MOST PROMISING AVENUES AND LEVELS OF ACTIVITY ARE EXAMINED UNDER THREE SEPARATE, BUT NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE SETS OF OPTIONS, OR POLICY "TRACKS."

THE FIRST SET OF OPTIONS ARGUES THAT WE CONTINUE TO FOLLOW OUR PRESENT POLICY LINE, BUT REDUCE THE VOLUME OF PUBLIC COMMENT ON SOVIET-CUBAN MEDDLING IN AFRICA AND WORK WITH SELECTED AFRICAN LEADERS, OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES AND OTHERS TO HELP MAKE THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY INTO AN EFFECTIVE FORCE TO MUTE INTRA-AFRICAN CONFLICTS AND REDUCE
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THE OPPORTUNITIES THE SOVIETS HAVE TO INTRODUCE THEIR MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND CUBAN MANPOWER INTO SUCH CONFLICTS. THE BASIC ASSUMPTIONS ARE THAT HAVANA AND MOSCOW WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY ENMESHED IN NO-WIN SITUATIONS IN THE HORN AND ANGOLA; THAT WE SHOULD MAINTAIN OUR LONG-RANGE STRATEGY OF SEEKING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN AND WORK BEHIND THE SCENES WITH THE PROTAGONISTS AND THE ARABS TO ARRANGE A HORN SUMMIT; AND LEAVE THE MAJOR SECURITY BURDENS IN WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA TO FRANCE AND BELGIUM, WHILE CONCENTRATING OUR EFFORTS ON INCREASING DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND ON REASSURING MODERATE AFRICAN LEADERS THROUGH A MODEST PROGRAM OF FMS AND IMET. AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR IMPROVING OUR RELATIONS (AND THOSE OF OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS) WITH ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THOSE GOVERNMENTS WITH PROSPECTIVE ALTERNATIVES TO THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS AND STRENGTHEN OUR CAPABILITY TO FORESTALL REGIONAL CONFLICTS.

A SECOND SET OF OPTIONS SUGGESTS THAT OUR FIRST OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO ERODE THE LEGITIMACY OF THE SOVIET-CUBAN PRESENCE IN AFRICA AND POSITION OURSELVES TO BECOME THE INDISPENSABLE BROKER IN MEDIATING AFRICAN CONFLICTS WHILE OFFERING THE SOVIETS THE PROSPECT OF A GRACEFUL RETREAT.

WITH REGARD TO SOUTHER AFRICA, WE WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS THAT IF THEY CHOOSE TO FOMENT RACE WAR, THEY MUST EXPECT TO PAY THE PRICE IN TERMS OF THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE US AND THE WEST IN GENERAL. WITH RESPECT TO CUBA WE WOULD ATTEMPT TO FERTILIZE NASCENT TENSIONS BETWEEN SOVIET AND CUBAN OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS IN AFRICA AND WORK WITH OUR ALLIES TO DAMAGE CUBA'S LINKS WITH DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, AS WELL AS ITS ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. THE MAJOR ASSUMPTION OF THIS OPTION "TRACK" IS THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO SETTLE

OUR DIFFERENCES WITH THE SOVIETS OVER AFRICA AND THAT WE
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MUST WORK TO ABSORB THESE ISSUES INTO THE GENERAL FRAME-
WORK OF US AND WESTERN RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND CUBA.

THE THIRD SET OF OPTIONS TAKES AS ITS STARTING POINT THE
ASSUMPTIONS THAT THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY CLIMATE IN
AFRICA IS DETERIORATING, THAT THE AFRICANS ALONE ARE NOT
ABLE TO ARREST THIS TREND, AND THAT THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS
WILL CONTINUE TO PROBE FOR WEAK SPOTS UNTIL THEY MEET FIRM
OPPOSITION. OUR PRINCIPAL ACTIONS TO MEET THIS SITUATION
WOULD INCLUDE WORKING WITH THE EUROPEANS, ARABS AND RECEPTIVE
AFRICANS TO BUILD REGIONAL POWER CENTERS AS DIKES
AGAINST THE ADVANCES OF THE SOVIETS AND THEIR SURROGATES
AND AN ANNOUNCED PUBLIC POLICY OF TAKING UP THE SOVIET
AND CUBAN CHALLENGE IN AFRICA THROUGH A COMBINATION OF
EXPANDED ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE. WE SHOULD
MAINTAIN OUR CURRENT STRATEGY AND EFFORTS IN SOUTHERN
AFRICA, BUT CONSIDER ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SANCTIONS
AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA AND HOLD OUT TO MOZAMBIQUE AND THE
OTHER FRONTLINE STATES THE POSSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC AND
OTHER ASSISTANCE.

4. RESPONSE TO PRM 36: CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC POSTURE.

ALTHOUGH SOME AMERICANS ARE INTENSELY INTERESTED IN AFRICA
AND IN CURRENT AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
AS A WHOLE IS DISINTERESTED IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS. POLLING
RESULTS SUGGEST A RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL OF PUBLIC ATTENTION
TO THE SOVIET/CUBAN PRESENCE IN AFRICA. THE AVAILABLE
DATA DO MAKE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE OVERRIDING CONCERN
OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC IS THAT AMERICAN PERSONNEL NOT BE-
COME INVOLVED IN ANY AFRICAN CONFLICT. TO THE EXTENT THAT
THERE IS PUBLIC AWARENESS OF SOVIET AND CUBAN ACTIVITY
IN AFRICA, A MAJORITY OF AMERICANS QUITE LIKELY BELIEVES
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THAT THE CUBANS AND SOVIETS ARE BENT ON MISCHIEF. A
COUNTER-MOVE THAT WOULD SEEK TO PENALIZE THE SOVIETS AND
THE CUBANS FOR THEIR ADVERTURISM WOULD PROBABLY BE WEL-
COMED -- SO LONG AS DIRECT INTERVENTION BY AMERICANS WAS
NOT A FORESEEABLE RISK. IF THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFRICA

BECOMES MORE VISIBLE AND ITS DISRUPTIVE INFLUENCE MORE
UNMISTAKABLE, IT IS LIKELY THAT PUBLIC SENTIMENT FOR RE-
SPONDING VIGOROUSLY -- BUT NOT IN KIND -- WOULD INTENSIFY
MARKEDLY. IN THIS EVENT, THERE WOULD BE GROWING SUPPORT
FOR "LINKAGE". SENTIMENT WOULD GROW FOR MAKING PROGRESS
ON SOME MAJOR ISSUE CONTINGENT ON SOVIET DISENGAGEMENT IN

AFRICA; SUSPICIONS ABOUT SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH SALT WOULD GROW, GROUNDED ON THE BELIEF THAT THE SOVIETS BY THEIR ACTIONS IN AFRICA HAD SHOWN THEMSELVES DUPLICITOUS ON DETENTE.

ASIDE FROM A HANDFUL OF MEMBERS, THE CONGRESS HAD UNTIL VERY RECENTLY, LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OF OR INTEREST IN AFRICA. AS THE RESULT OF RECENT EXECUTIVE BRANCH STATEMENTS AND PRESS PLAY ABOUT SOVIET/CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA, CONGRESSIONAL AWARENESS OF THE PROBLEM HAS GROWN. HOWEVER, THERE IS AS YET NO CONSENSUS ON THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET/CUBAN PRESENCE OR ON WHAT THE US SHOULD DO ABOUT IT. CONGRESS IS CONFUSED ABOUT WHAT US POLICY IN AFRICA REALLY IS, AND PERCEIVES THE US AS REACTING TO EVENTS IN AFRICA RATHER THAN RESPONDING TO THEM IN A UNIFIED WAY WITHIN A COHERENT POLICY FRAMEWORK. THE CONGRESS IS SIMILARLY CONFUSED OVER THE DIRECTION OF US POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. IN THE BACKGROUND, COLORING CONGRESSIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET/CUBAN AFRICAN ADVENTURISM IS THE APPREHENSION THAT US INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA COULD ENSNARE US IN ANOTHER VIET NAM.

THE PREREQUISITE TO AN EFFECTIVE PUBLIC POSTURE -- AT HOME AND ABROAD -- ON SOVIET/CUBAN INTERVENTION IN AFRICA IS
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AN AUTHORITATIVELY ARTICULATED STATEMENT OF US POLICY WHICH SETS FORTH OUR VIEW OF AFRICA, DEFINES OUR LONG-TERM PURPOSES IN POSITIVE TERMS, AND OUTLINES THE TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP WE DESIRE TO HAVE WITH THE SOVIETS. VANCE

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